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Abstract
In information sharing networks, having a privacy pre-
serving index (or PPI) is critically important for providing
efficient search on access controlled content across dis-
tributed providers while preserving privacy. An understud-
ied problem for PPI techniques is how to provide control-
lable privacy preservation, given the innate difference of
privacy of the different content and providers. In this paper
we present a configurable privacy preserving index, coined
ǫ-PPI, which allows for quantitative privacy protection
levels on fine-grained data units. We devise a new common-
identity attack that breaks existing PPI’s and propose an
identity-mixing protocol against the attack in ǫ-PPI. The
proposed ǫ-PPI construction protocol is the first without
any trusted third party and/or trust relationship between
providers. We have implemented our ǫ-PPI construction
protocol by using generic MPC techniques (secure multi-
party computation) and optimized the performance to a
practical level by minimizing the costly MPC computation
part.
I. Introduction
In information networks, autonomous service providers
store private personal records on behalf of individual own-
ers and enable information sharing under strict enforce-
ment of access control rules. Such information networks
have the following salient features: 1) providers, each
under a different administrative domain, do not mutually
trust each other, 2) providers have the responsibility of
protecting owners’ privacy and 3) it is crucial to share
information between providers from an application per-
spective.
An example of the information network is the emerging
Nationwide eHealthcare Information Network (NHIN [1]
and Healthcare software CONNECT [2]), in which patients
delegate their personal medical records to the hospitals
where they have visited. Different hospitals may com-
pete for customer patients and have conflicting economic
interests, which renders it hard to build full trust re-
lationships between them. Hospitals are responsible for
protecting patient privacy, which is regulated by Federal
laws (e.g. HiPPA [3]). On the other hand, to provide
immediate and accurate medical diagnosis and treatment,
it is important to have an information sharing service; for
example, when a patient who is unconscious is sent to
a hospital, such information sharing can help the doctor
be able to retrieve the patients’ medical history that in-
volves multiple (untrusted) hospitals. Another example is
cross-university online course management systems (e.g.
StudIP [4], Swiki [5]). Such online systems allow sharing
of access-controlled materials within groups of students
and teachers; while the information sharing is crucial for
collaborative learning and improved learning efficiency,
it may pose a threat to student privacy; on the other
hand, protection of student privacy is required by Federal
laws (e.g. FERPA [6]). In these untrusted networks with
needs of cross-domain collaborations, it calls for a global
mechanism to protect privacy of a patient or a student,
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Fig. 1: The system of PPI and the provider network
To support and promote information sharing among
mutually untrusted providers, privacy preserving index
or PPI [7], [8], [9], [10] is proposed. The PPI aims at
supporting a global search facility hosted on a third-party
entity; the design of PPI should respect the providers’
complete access control on personal records and protect
their privacy. The typical working of a PPI, as will be
elaborated in Section II, is a two-phase search procedure.
As in Figure 1, a searcher, in the hope of finding certain
owners’ records, first queries the PPI, and obtains a list
of providers that may or may not have the records of
interest. Then for each provider in the list, the searcher
attempts to get authenticated and authorized before she
can locally search the private records there. A PPI is
usually hosted on a third-party and untrusted entity, mainly
because of the difficulty to find a global entity trusted by all
(mutually untrusted) providers; for example, consider the
U.S. government as a candidate; various scandals including
the recent PRISM program [11] have made the government
lose the public trust. Hence, it is desirable to construct
the PPI in such a way that the data owners’ privacy is
protected.
Quantitatively Differentiated Privacy Preservation
While existing PPI’s have addressed privacy preserva-
tion, none of these approaches recognize the needs of
differentiating privacy preservation for different owners
and providers. To be specific, the privacy goals addressed
by a PPI system are about a private fact whether “an
owner tj has his/her record stored on provider pi”. It is
evident that disclosing the private fact regarding different
owners and providers causes different levels of privacy
concerns. For example, a woman may consider her visit
to a women’s health center (e.g., for an abortion) much
more sensitive than her visit to a general hospital (e.g.,
for cough treatment). Similarly, different owners may have
different levels of concerns regarding their privacy: while
an average person may not care too much about their visit
to a hospital, a celebrity may be more concerned about it,
because even a small private matter of a celebrity can be
publicized by the media (e.g., by paparazzi). To address the
innate privacy difference of owners, it is therefore critical
to differentiate privacy protection to address the innate
different privacy concerns in a PPI system. That being said,
using existing PPI approaches can not provide quantitative
guarantees on the privacy preservation degree, let alone on
a fine-grained per-owner basis. The cause, largely due to
the degree-agnostic way of constructing PPI systems, is
analyzed in Appendix B.
In this paper, we propose a new PPI abstraction for
differentiated and quantitative privacy control, coined ǫ-
PPI. Here, ǫ is a privacy aware knob that allows each
owner to mark a desired privacy level when delegating data
to the providers. Specifically, ǫj is a value in a spectrum
from 0 to 1, where value 0 is for the least privacy concern
(in this case, the PPI returns the list of exactly those “true
positive” providers who truly have the records of interest)
and value 1 for the best privacy preservation (in this case,
PPI returns all providers, and a search essentially goes to
the whole network). By this means, an attacker observing
the PPI search result can only have a bounded confidence
by ǫ in successfully identifying a true positive (and thus
vulnerable) provider from the obscured provider list.
Challenges: To construct the new ǫ-PPI abstraction,
it poses challenges. On one hand, achieving quantitative
privacy guarantee typically requires the index construction
to know more about providers’ data (e.g. owner identity
distribution across the provider network), which entails
information exchange between providers. On the other
hand, providers do not trust each other and may feel
reluctant to disclose too detailed information. Therefore,
it is essential to draw a clear line between what is private
information and what is not during the index construction,
and to fully utilize the non-private information to provide
as much quantitative guarantee as possible. In our proposed
construction protocol, we utilize the owner frequency (i.e.
the number of providers an owner has delegated her
records to). Our unique insight in protocol design is that
the owner frequency is private only when the value is big
(i.e., when the owner’s record appears almost everywhere).
This is because knowing such “common” owners would
give an adversary confidence to make successful guesses
regarding any provider. By only releasing the small-value
frequency, we can protect providers’ privacy and deliver a
quantitative guarantee.
In realizing the design protocol in a mutually untrusted
network, we rely on MPC computation (i.e., secure multi-
party computation [12], [13], [14], [15]) which addresses
the input privacy for generic computation. However, it
raises performance issues when directly applying MPC
techniques in our problem setting. On one hand, current
MPC computation platforms can only scale to small work-
loads [16]; they are practically efficient only for simple
computation among few parties. On the other hand, a
typical PPI construction may involve thousands of own-
ers and tens or hundreds of providers, which entails an
intensive use of bit-wise MPC computation. It is therefore
critical to a practical MPC protocol to efficiently carry out
the computation for ǫ-PPI construction. In this regards,
we propose to minimize the expensive MPC computation
by using a parallel secure sum protocol. The secure sum
can be efficiently carried out by a proposed secret shar-
ing scheme with additive homomorphism. Based on the
proposed MPC primitive, our index construction protocol
protects providers’ privacy and can tolerate collusion of up
to c providers (c is configurable).
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows,
• We propose ǫ-PPI that differentiates the needs of
privacy protection in a quantitative manner. The ǫ-
PPI exposes a new delegate operation to owners,
which allows them to specify their different levels of
privacy concerns. This new privacy knob, coined ǫ,
can give quantitative privacy control while enabling
information sharing.
• We propose ǫ-PPI construction protocol for an un-
trusted environment. As far as we know, this is the
first PPI construction protocol without assumption on
trusted parties or mutual trust relationships between
providers. The performance of ǫ-PPI construction
protocol is extensively optimized by reducing the
use of costly generic MPC and using the proposed
domain-specific protocols. The proposed construction
protocol is implemented and evaluated with verified
performance superiority.
• We introduce a new privacy attack (called common-
owner attack) that can break generic PPI systems.
The new attack model targets vulnerable common
owners. Our proposed ǫ-PPI is the first to resist
common-owner attacks by using a proposed term-
mixing protocol.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II
formulates the ǫ-PPI problem. Section III and IV respec-
tively describe the computation model and distributed im-
plementation of the ǫ-PPI construction protocol. Section V
presents evaluation results, and Section VI surveys the
related work before the conclusion in Section VII.
II. Problem Formulation
A. System Model
We formally describe our system model, which involves
four entities: 1) a set of n data owners, each of whom,
identified by tj , holds a set of personal records, 2) a
provider network consisting of m providers in which a
provider pi is an autonomously operating entity (e.g. a
hospital or a university), 3) a global PPI server in a third-
party domain, 4) a data searcher who wants to find all the
records of an owner of interest. The interactions between
these four entities are formulated in the following four
operations.
• Delegate(< tj , ǫj >, pi): A data owner tj can
delegate her records to provider pi based on her trust
relationship (e.g. such trust can be built based on her
visit to a hospital). Along with the record delegation,
the owner can specify her preferred privacy degree
ǫj . Here ǫj indicates the level of privacy concerns,
ranging from 0 up to 1. For example, a VIP user (e.g.
a celebrity patient in the eHealthcare network) may
want to set the privacy level at a high value while an
average patient may set the privacy level at a medium
value 1
• ConstructPPI({ǫj}): After data records are popu-
lated, all m providers in the network join a procedure
ConstructPPI to collectively construct the privacy
preserving index. The index construction should com-
ply with owner-specified privacy degree {ǫj}. As will
be elaborated, the constructed PPI contains noises or
false positives for the purpose of privacy preservation
and {ǫj} is materialized as the false positive rate of
owner tj .
• QueryPPI(tj)→ {pi}: At data serving time, a
searcher s, in the hope of finding owner tj’s records,
initiates a two-phase search procedure consisting of
two operations, QueryPPI(tj)→ {pi} and Auth-
Search(s, {pi}, tj). This is illustrated in Figure 1.
For the first phase, the searcher poses query request,
QueryPPI(tj), and the PPI server returns a list of
providers {pi} who may or may not have records
of the requested owner tj . The query evaluation
in PPI server is trivially done since the PPI, once
constructed, contains the (obscured) mapping between
providers and owners.
• AuthSearch(s, {pi}, tj): The second phase in the
search is for searcher s to contact each provider in list
{pi} (i.e. the result list from the first phase) and to find
owner tj’s records there. This process involves user
authentication and authorization regarding searcher s;
we assume each provider has already set up its local
access control subsystem for authorized access to the
private personal records. Only after authorization can
the searcher search the local repository on provider
pi.
We describe the internal data model in a PPI. Each
personal record contains an owner identity tj
2 (e.g. the
person’s name). As shown in Figure 2, a provider pi sum-
marizes its local record repository by a membership vector
Mi(·); it indicates the list of owners who have delegated
their records on provider pi. For example, provider p0 who
has records of owner t0 and t1 maintains a membership
vector as Mi = {t0 : 1, t1 : 1, t2 : 0}. In our model,
the same owner can have records spread across multiple
providers (e.g., a patient can visit multiple hospitals). The
constructed PPI maintains a mapping between providers
1To prevent every user from setting the highest value of ǫ, one possible
way is to differentiate prices for different privacy settings. The system
has incentive to do so, since high privacy settings incur more overhead
in the provider networks.
2In this paper, we use “owner” and “identity” interchangeably.
and owners; it is essentially a combination of all provider-
wise membership data, yet with noises. The PPI mapping
data is an m × n matrix M ′(·, ·), in which each row
is of an owner, each column of a provider and each
cell of a Boolean value to indicate the membership/non-
membership of the owner to the provider. For the purpose
of privacy preservation, there are noises or false positives
added in the matrix; for example, regarding provider p1
and owner t0, value 1 in the published PPI M is a false
positive in the sense that provider p1 does not have any
records of owner t0 but falsely claims to do so. The false


























Fig. 2: ǫ-PPI model
Table I summarizes the notations that will be used
throughout the rest of the paper.
TABLE I: Notations
Symbols of system model
tj The j-th owner (identity) n Number of owners
ǫj Privacy degree of tj
pi The i-th provider m Number of providers
Mi(·) Local vector of pi M
′(·, ·) Data matrix in the PPI
Symbols of ǫ-PPI construction
βj Publishing probability of
tj
σj Frequency of owner tj
λ Percentage of common
owners
fpj Achieved false positive
rate of tj
B. Threat Model
Privacy goals: In our work, we are mainly con-
cerned with the owner-membership privacy; for an owner
tj , the owner-membership privacy is about which providers
the owner tj’s records belong to, that is, M(i, j) = 1
3.
Knowing this information, one can develop the private
personal knowledge; for example, knowing that a sport
celebrity has records stored in a surgery hospital allows
one to infer that he or she may have had a medical
condition possibly requiring surgery and may be absent
in the rest of the season. Other privacy goals related
to the PPI system but not addressed in this work in-
clude searcher anonymity and record content privacy. The
searcher anonymity prevents an attacker from knowing
3We use M·(·) and M(·, ·) interchangeably.
which owner(s) a searcher has searched for, which can
be protected by various anonymity protocols [17]. The
record content privacy [7] involves the detailed content of
an owner’s record.
In order to attack the owner-membership privacy, we
consider a threat model in which an attacker can exploit
multiple information sources through different channels. In
particular, we consider the following privacy-threatening
scenarios:
• Primary attack : The primary attack scenario is
that an attacker randomly or intentionally chooses a
provider pi and an owner tj , and then claims that
“owner tj has delegated his/her records to provider
pi”. To determine which providers and owners to
attack, the attacker learns about the publicly available
PPI data M ′, and attacks only those with M ′(i, j) =
1. Given an owner tj , the attacker can randomly or
intentionally (e.g. by her prior knowledge) picks a
provider pi so that M
′(i, j) = 1. To further refine the
attack and improve the confidence, the attacker can
exploit other knowledge through various channels,
such as colluding providers. Due to space limit, we
focus on the attack through the public channel in this
paper (the colluding attack and analysis can be found
in the tech report [18]).
• Common-identity attack : This attack focuses on
the common identity which appears in almost all
providers in the network. The attacker can learn about
the truthful frequency of owner identity σj from the
public PPI matrix M ′ (as will be analyzed many
PPI’s [9], [7], [8] reveals the truthful frequency)
and choose the owners with high frequency. By
this means, the attacker can have better confidence
in succeeding an attack. For example, consider the
following extreme case: by learning an owner identity
is with frequency σj = 100%, the attacker can choose
any provider and be sure that the chosen provider
must be a true positive (i.e., M(i, j) = 1).
This paper focuses on attacks on a single owner, while
a multi-owner attack boils down to multiple single-owner
attacks.
C. Privacy Metric and Degrees
Privacy metric: We measure the privacy disclosure
by the confidence an attacker can succeeding an attack.
Formally, given an attack on an owner tj and provider pi,
we measure the privacy disclosure by the probability that
the attack can succeed, that is, Pr(M(i, j) = 1|M ′(i, j) =
1). To measure the privacy protection level of a specific
owner tj , we use the average probability of successful
attacks against all possible providers that are subject to
M ′(i, j) = 1. The privacy metric is formulated as follow-
ing.
Pr(M(·, j)|M ′(·, j)) = AVG
∀i,M′(i,j)=1
(
Pr(M(i, j) = 1|M ′(i, j) = 1)
)
= 1− fpj
Here, fpj is the false positive rate of providers in the
list of providers M ′(i, j) = 1. The privacy disclosure
metric on owner tj is equal to 1− fpj , because the false
positive providers determines the probability that an attack
can succeed/fail. For example, if the list {pi|M(i, j) = 1}
is completely without any false positive providers (i.e.
fpj = 0%), then attacks on any provider can succeed,
leading to 100% = 1−fpj success probability/confidence.
Based on the privacy metric, we further define four
discrete privacy degrees. The definition of privacy degrees
are based on an information flow model of our privacy
threat model, in which an attacker obtains information
from the information source through different channels.
• UNLEAKED: The information can not flow from the
source, and the attacker can not know the information.
This is the highest privacy protection level.
• ǫ-PRIVATE: The information can flow to attack-
ers through the channel of public PPI data or PPI
construction process. If this occurs, the PPI design
protects privacy from being disclosed. The PPI can
provide a quantitative guarantee on the privacy leak-
age. Formally, given a privacy degree ǫj , this privacy
degree requires the quantitative guarantee as follows.
Pr(M(·, j)|M ′(·, j)) ≤ 1− ǫj (1)
In particular, when ǫ = 0%, the attacker might
be 100% confident about success of the attack, and
privacy is definitely leaked.
• NOGUARANTEE: The information can flow to the
attacker and the PPI design can not provide any
guarantee on privacy leakage. That is, the achieved
value of privacy leakage metric may be unpredictable.
• NOPROTECT: The information can flow to the at-
tacker and the PPI design does not address the privacy
preservation. That is, the privacy is definitely leaked
and the attack can succeed with 100% certainty. This
is equivalent to the special case of NOGUARANTEE
where ǫj = 0%. This is the lowest level of privacy
preservation.
Based on our privacy model and metric, we can summa-
rize the prior work in Table II. Due to the space limitation,
we put the analysis in Appendix B.
TABLE II: Comparison of ǫ-PPI against existing PPI’s
Primary attack Common-identity attack
PPI [7], [8] NOGUARANTEE NOGUARANTEE
SS-PPI [9] NOGUARANTEE NOPROTECT
ǫ-PPI ǫ-PRIVATE ǫ-PRIVATE
D. Index Construction of Quantitative Pri-
vacy Preservation
In the ǫ-PPI, we aim at achieving ǫ-PRIVATE on a
per-identity basis (i.e. differentiating privacy preservation
for different owners). The formal problem that this paper
address is the index construction of quantitative privacy
preservation, which is stated as below.
Proposition 2.1: Consider a network with m providers
and n owners; each provider pi has a local Boolean vector
Mi of its membership of n owners. Each owner tj has
a preferred level of privacy preservation ǫj . The problem
of quantitative privacy preserving index construction is to
construct a PPI that can bound any attacker’s confidence
(measured by our per-owner privacy metric) under ǫj , with
regards to all attacks on owner tj as described in our threat
model.
III. ǫ-PPI Construction: the Computation
Our ǫ-PPI construction is based on a proposed two-
phase framework in which providers first collectively cal-
culate a global value β, and then each provider indepen-
dently publishes its local vector randomly based on prob-
ability β. This framework requires complex computations.
In this section, we introduce them at different levels of
granularity: First we take an overview of our two-phase
construction framework with emphasis on describing the
second phase. We then introduce the first phase (called the
β calculation) in details; we present the detailed calculation
of β under two kinds of owner identities, namely the
common and non-common owners. At last, we conduct
the privacy analysis.
A. A Two-Phrase Construction Framework
We propose a two-phase framework for the ǫ-PPI con-
struction. First, for each owner identity tj , all m providers
collectively calculate a probability value βj . In the second
phase, the private membership value regarding owner tj
and every provider pi is published. In this paragraph, we
assume βj is already calculated and focus on describing
the second phase – how to use βj to publish private data.
Recall that in our data model, each provider pi has a
Boolean value M(i, j) that indicates the membership of
owner tj in this provider. After knowing value of βj ,
provider pi starts to publish this private Boolean value
by randomly flipping it at probability βj . To be specific,
given a membership Boolean value (i.e. M(i, j) = 1), it
is always truthfully published as 1, that is, M ′(i, j) = 1.
Given a non-membership value (i.e. M(i, j) = 0), it is
negated to M ′(i, j) = 1 at probability βj . We call the
negated value as the false positive in the published PPI.
The following formula describes the randomized publi-
cation. Note when Boolean value M(i, j) = 1, it is not
allowed to be published as M ′(i, j) = 0.
0 →
{
1, with probability β
0, with probability 1− β
1 → 1 (2)
The truthful publication rule (i.e. 1 → 1) guarantees
that relevant providers are always in the QueryPPI result
and the 100% query recall is ensured. The false-positive
publication rule (i.e. 0 → 1) adds noises or false positives
to the published PPI which can help obscure the true
owner-to-provider membership and thus preserves owner-
membership privacy. For multiple owners, different β’s are
calculated and the randomized publication runs indepen-
dently.
An example: Consider the case in Figure 2. For
owner t0, if the β0 is calculated to be 0.5, then provider p1
would publish its negative membership value M1(0) = 0
as value 1 with probability 0.5. In this example, it is
flipped and the constructed ǫ-PPI contains M ′(1, 0) = 1.
Similarly for identity t2 and provider p0, it is also subject
to flipping at probability β2. In this example, it is not
flipped, and the constructed ǫ-PPI contains M ′(0, 2) = 0.
B. The β Calculation
In the randomized publication, βj determines the
amount of false positives in the published ǫ-PPI. For
quantitative privacy preservation, it is essential to calculate
a βj value that makes the false positive amount meet the
privacy requirement regarding ǫj . In this part, we focus on
the calculation of β which serves as the first phase in ǫ-PPI
construction process. Concretely we consider two cases:
the common identity case and the non-common identity
case. Recall that the common identity refers to such an
owner who delegates her records to almost all providers
in the network. The general PPI construction is vulnerable
to the common-identity attack and it needs to be specially
treated.
1) The Case of Non-common Identity: In the case of
non-common identity, negative providers suffice to meet
the desired privacy degree. We consider the problem of
setting value βj for identity tj in order to meet the desired
ǫj . Recall the randomized publication: Multiple providers
independently runs an identical random process, and this
can be modeled as a series of Bernoulli trials (note that the
publishing probability β(tj) is the same to all providers).
Our goal is to achieve privacy requirement that fpj ≥ ǫj
with high level success rate pp, that is, pp = Pr(fpj ≥ ǫj).
Under this model, we propose three policies to calculate
β with different quantitative guarantees: a basic policy βb
that guarantees fpj ≥ ǫj with 50% probability, and an
incremented expectation based policy βd, and a Chernoff
bound based policy betac that guarantees fpj ≥ ǫj with γ
probability where success rate γ can be configured.
Basic policy: The basic policy sets the β value
so that the expected amount of false positives among m
providers can reach a desired level, which is, ǫj ·m(1−σj).
We can have the following,
ǫj =
(1− σj) · βb(tj)
(1− σj) · βb(tj) + σj






The basic policy has poor quality in attaining the desired
privacy preservation; the actual value fpj is bigger than
ǫj with only 50% success rate.
Incremented expectation-based policy: The incre-
mented expectation-based approach is to increase the
expectation-based βb(tj) by a constant value, that is,
βd(tj) = βb(tj) + ∆ (4)
Incremental ∆ can be configurable based on the quality
requirement; the bigger the value is, the higher success
rate pp is expected to attain. However, there is no direct
connection between the configured value of ∆ and the
success rate pp that can be achieved, leaving it a hard task
to figure out the right value of ∆ based on desired pp.
Chernoff bound-based policy: Toward an effective
policy to calculate β, we apply the Chernoff bounds to
the Bernoulli trial model of the randomized publication
process. This policy allows direct control of the success
rate. Formally, it has the property described in Theorem 3.1
(with the proof in Appendix A-A).






βc(tj) ≥ βb(tj) +Gj +
√
G2j + 2βb(tj)Gj (5)
Then, randomized publication with β(tj) = βc(tj) sta-
tistically guarantees the published ǫ-PPI with privacy
requirement fpj ≥ ǫj with success rate larger than γ.
2) The Case of Common Identities: With the above β
calculation for non-common identities, the constructed ǫ-
PPI is vulnerable to the common-identity attack. Because
the β∗
4 bears information of identity frequency σj , and
during our index construction framework, β needs to be
released to all participating providers. A colluding provider
4We use β∗ to denote the probability value calculated by any of the
three policies for non-common identities.
would release such information to the attacker who can
easily obtain the truthful identity frequency σ (e.g., from
Equation 3 assuming ǫj is publicly known) and effectively
formulates the common-identity attack.
To defend against the common-identity attack, ǫ-PPI
construction employs an identity-mixing technique for
common identities. The idea is to mix common identities
with certain non-common identities by exaggerating the
calculated βj (i.e. falsely increasing certain βj to 100%)
from which one can not distinguish common identities
from the rest. To be specific, for a non-common identity tj ,











, β∗ < 1
1, β∗ ≥ 1
(6)
Given a set of common identities, we need to determine
how many non-common identities should be chosen for
mixing, in other words, to determine the value of λ. While
a big value of λ can hide common identities among the
non-common ones, it incurs unnecessarily high search cost.
On the other hand, a value of λ which is too small would
leave common identities unprotected and vulnerable. In
ǫ-PPI, we use the following heuristic-based policy to
calculate λ.
• In the set of mixed identities, the percentage of




1 common identities and thus
∑
β∗<1
























3) β Calculation: Putting It Together: We summarize
the β calculation in the ǫ-PPI construction. For each
identity tj , β(tj) is calculated based on Equation 6, which
follows the computation flows as below. The underline
symbol indicates the variable is private and ⇒ indicates
the computation is fairly complex (e.g. involving square
root when calculating β∗).




1 → Common id percentage λ → Final probability β
C. Privacy Analysis of Constructed ǫ-PPI
We present the privacy analysis of the constructed ǫ-PPI
under our threat model.
Privacy under primary attack: The property of the
three policies of calculating β∗ suggests that the false
positive rate in the published ǫ-PPI should be no smaller
than ǫj in a statistical sense. Recall that the false positive
rate bounds the attacker’s confidence; it implies that ǫ-
PPI achieves an ǫ-PRIVATE degree against the primary
attack. It is noteworthy that our ǫ-PPI is fully resistant
to repeated attacks against the same identity over time,
because the ǫ-PPI is static; once constructed and having
privacy protected, it stays the same.
Privacy under common-identity attack: For
common-identity attack, the attacker’s confidence in
choosing a true common identity depends on the
percentage of true common identities among the (mixed)
common identities in the published ǫ-PPI. Therefore
the privacy preservation degree is bounded by the
percentage of false positives (in this case, it depends
on the percentage of the non-common identities which
is mixed and published as common identities in the
published ǫ-PPI), which equals ξ. By properly setting λ,
we can have ξ = max∀tj∈{common identities} ǫj . By this way,
it is guaranteed to achieve the per-identity ǫ-PRIVATE
degree against the common-identity attack.
IV. ǫ-PPI Construction: Realization
The information network lacks mutual trusts between
providers, which poses new challenges when putting the
ǫ-PPI construction in practice. This section describes the
design and implementation of a distributed and secure pro-
tocol that realizes the computation of ǫ-PPI construction
described in the previous section.
A. Challenge and Design
The goal of our protocol is to efficiently and securely
compute the publishing probability {βj} among a set of
mutually untrusted providers who are reluctant to ex-
change the private membership vector with others. On
one hand, the secure computation would require multi-
party computation (or MPC) which respects the per-party
input privacy. Current techniques for MPC only support
small computation workloads [16]. On the other hand,
the computation required in ǫ-PPI construction is big and
complex; the computation model involves large number
of identities and providers; even for a single identity
involves fairly complex computation (e.g., square root and
logarithm as in Equation 5). This poses a huge challenge to
design a practical protocol for secure ǫ-PPI construction.
To address the above challenge, we propose an efficient
and secure construction protocol by following the design
principle of minimizing the secure computation. Given
a computation flow in Equation 8, our secure protocol
design has three salient features: 1) It separates the secure
and non-secure computations by the last appearance of
private variables in the flow (note that the computation
flows from the private data input to the end of non-private
result). 2) It reorders the computation to minimize the
expensive secure computation. The idea is to push down
complex computation towards the non-private end. To be
specific, instead of first carrying out complex floating point
computations for raw probability β, as in Formula 8, we
push such computations down through the flow and pull
up the obscuring computations for private input, as in
Formula 9. 3) To scale to a large number of providers, we
propose an efficient protocol for calculating secure sum,




σ<σ′ 1 → λ →
{
→ β = 1
⇒ β = β∗
(9)
B. The Distributed Algorithm
Following our design, we propose a practical distributed
algorithm to run the two-phase ǫ-PPI construction. The
overall workflow is illustrated in Figure 3. For simplicity,
we focus on phase 1 for β calculation. The β calcula-
tion is realized in two stages by itself: As illustrated in
Algorithm 1, the first stage is a SecSumShare protocol
which, given m input Boolean from the providers, outputs
c secret shares whose sum is equal to the sum of these
m Boolean. Here, c is the number of shares that can be
configurable based on the tolerance on provider collusion.
The output c shares have the security property that a party
knowing x < c shares can not deduce any information
about the sensitive sum of m Boolean. For different iden-
tities, the SecSumShare protocol runs multiple instances
independently and in parallel, which collectively produce
c vectors of shares, denoted by s(i, ·), where i ∈ [0, c−1].
The c vectors are distributed to c coordinate providers (for
simplicity we assume they are providers p0, . . . , pc−1) on
which the second-stage protocol, CountBelow, is run. As
shown by Algorithm 2, given c vectors s(0, ·), . . . s(c−1, ·)
and a threshold t, the CountBelow algorithm sums them
to vector
∑
i s(i, ·) and counts the number of elements that
are bigger than t.
1) Distributed Algorithm for SecSumShare: We use
an example in the top box in Figure 3 to illustrate the
distributed algorithm of SecSumShare. In the example
c = 3 and there are five providers p0, . . . p4. The example
focuses on a single identity case for tj (e.g. j = 0). Out
of the 5 providers, p1 and p2 have records of owner t0
(i.e., M(1, 0) = M(2, 0) = 1). SecSumShare requires
modular operations; in this example, the modulus divisor
is q = 5. It runs in the following 4 steps.
TABLE III: Distributed algorithms for ǫ-PPI construction
Algorithm 1 calculate-beta(M0, . . .Mn−1)
1: {s(0, ·), . . . s(c− 1, ·)} ← SecSumShare(M0, . . .Mn−1)
2: σ′(·) is calculated under condition β∗ = 1, by either




1←CountBelow(s(0, ·), . . . s(c− 1, ·), σ′(·) ·m)
4: {β0, . . . βm−1} ←
∑
σ≥σ′
1 ⊲ By Equation 9
Algorithm 2 CountBelow(s(0, ·), . . . s(c− 1, ·), threshold t)
1: count← 0
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Phase 1.2: Calculate β






Fig. 3: An example of ǫ-PPI construction algorithm
1 Generating shares: each provider pi decomposes its
private input Boolean M(i, j) into c shares, denoted
by {S(i, j, k)}, with k ∈ [0, c− 1]. The first c − 1
shares are randomly picked from interval [0, q] and
the last share is deterministically chosen so that the
sum of all shares equals the input Boolean M(i, 0)
in modulo q. That is, (
∑
k∈[0,c] S(i, j, k)) mod q =
M(i, j). In Figure 3, as depicted by arrows 1 ,
p0’s input M(0, 0) is decomposed to c = 3 shares,
{S(0, 0, k)|k} = {2, 3, 0}. It ensures (2 + 3 + 0)
mod 5 = 0.
2 Distributing shares: each provider pi then distributes
her shares to the next c − 1 neighbor providers; k-
th shares S(i, j, k) will be sent out to k-th successor
of provider pi, that is, p(i+k) mod m. As shown by
arrows 2 in Figure 3, p0 keeps the first share 2
locally, sends her second share 3 to her successor p1
and the third share 0 to 2-hop successor p2.
3 Summing shares: each provider then sums up all
shares she has received in the previous step to obtain
the super-share. In Figure 3, after the step of share
distribution, provider p0 receives 3 from p3, 4 from
p4 and 2 from herself. As depicted by arrows 3 , the
super-share is calculated to be 3+4+2 mod 5 = 4.
4 Aggregating super-shares: each provider sends her
super-share to a set of c coordinators. These coordi-
nators receiving super-shares then sum the received
shares up and output the summed vector s(i, ·) to
the next-stage CountBelow protocol. In Figure 3,
provider p0, p1, p2 are chosen as coordinators and
arrow 4 shows that the sum of super-shares on
provider p0 is s(0, 0) = (4 + 2) mod 5 = 1. The
sum of all the values on coordinators should be equal
to the number of total appearances of identity t0. That
is, 1 + 4 + 2 mod 5 = 2. Note two providers have
identity t0. This total appearance number or identity
frequency may be sensitive (in the case of com-
mon identity) and can not be disclosed immediately,
which is why we need the second stage protocol,
CountBelow.
2) Implementation of CountBelow computation: The
secure computation of CountBelow (in Algorithm 2) is
implemented by using a generic MPC protocol. Each party
corresponds to a coordinate provider in the ǫ-PPI system.
Specifically, we choose a Boolean-circuit based MPC
protocol FairplayMP [13] for implementation. The reason
is that compared to an arithmetic-circuit based protocol,
it lends itself to the computation of comparison required
in Algorithm 2 (i.e., in Line 4). In particular for c = 2,
the computation in CountBelow essentially boils down to
a comparison operation (i.e., s(0, i) > t − s(1, i)), and
the problem is reduced to a Millionaire problem [19]. The
distributed algorithm to carry out MPC (and thus our MPC-
based CountBelow computation) can be found in [12],
[13]. Since Algorithm 2 is implemented by expensive
MPC it normally becomes the bottleneck of the system;
in practice, c ≪ m and thus the network can scale to large
number of providers m while the MPC is still limited to
small subset of the network.
C. Privacy Analysis of Constructing ǫ-PPI
We analyze the privacy preservation of ǫ-PPI construc-
tion process. We mainly consider a semi-honest model,
which is consistent with the existing MPC work [13].
The privacy analysis is conducted from three aspects:
1) The privacy guarantee of SecSumShare protocol. It
guarantees: 1.1) (2c − 3)-secrecy of input privacy [9]:
With less than c providers in collusion, none of any
private input can be learned by providers other than its
owner. 1.2) c-secrecy of output privacy: the private sum
can only be reconstructed when all c shares are used.
With less than c shares, one can learn nothing regarding
the private sum. The output privacy is formally presented
in Theorem 4.1 with proof in Appendix A-B. 2) The
security and privacy of CountBelow relies on that of the
MPC used in implementation. The generic MPC technique
can provide information confidentiality against colluding
providers on c participating parties [13]. 3) The final output
β does not carry any private information, and is safe to
be released to the (potentially untrusted) providers for
randomized publication.
Theorem 4.1: The SecSumShare’s output is a
(c, c) secret sharing scheme. Specifically, for an
owner tj , SecSumShare protocol outputs c shares,
{s(i, j)|∀i ∈ [0, c− 1]}, whose sum is the secret vj . The
c shares have the following properties.
• Recoverability: Given c output shares, the secret value
vj (i.e. the sum) can be easily reconstructed.
• Secrecy: Given any c − 1 or fewer output shares,
one can learn nothing about the secret value, in the
sense that the conditional distribution given the known
shares is the same as the prior distribution,
∀x ∈ Zq, P r(vj = x) = Pr(vj = x|V ⊂ {s(i, j)}))
where V is any proper subset of {s(i, j)}.
V. Experiments
To evaluate the proposed ǫ-PPI, we have done two
set of experiments: The first set, with simulation-based
experiments, evaluates how effective the ǫ-PPI can be in
terms of delivering quantitative privacy protection, and
the second set evaluates the performance of our index
construction protocol. For realistic performance study, we
have implemented a functioning prototype for ǫ-PPI con-
struction.
A. Effectiveness of Privacy Preservation
Experimental setup: To simulate the informa-
tion provider network, we used a distributed document
dataset [20] of 2, 500−25, 000 small digital libraries, each
of which simulates a provider in our problem setting. To
be specific, this dataset defines a “collection” table, which
maintains the mapping from the documents to collections.
The documents are further derived from NIST’s publicly
available TREC-WT10g dataset [21]. To adapt to our
problem setting, each collection is treated as a provider
and the source web URLs (as defined in TREC-WT10g
dataset) of the documents are treated as owner’s identity.
If not otherwise specified, we use no more than 10, 000
providers in the experiments. Using the collection table, it
also allows us to emulate the membership matrix M . The
dataset does not have a privacy metric for the query phrase.
In our experiment, we randomly generate the privacy
degree ǫ in the domain [0, 1]. We use a metric, success
ratio, to measure the effectiveness. The success rate is the
percentage of identities whose false positive rates in the
constructed PPI are no smaller than the desired rate ǫj .
Due to space limit, the experiment results of different β
calculation policies can be found in Appendix C-A.
1) ǫ-PPI versus Existing Grouping-based PPI’s: The
experiments compare the ǫ-PPI with existing PPI’s. The
existing PPI’s [7], [8], [9] are based on a grouping
abstraction; providers are organized into disjoint privacy
groups so that different providers from the same group are
indistinguishable from the searchers. By contrast, ǫ-PPI
does not utilize grouping technique and is referred to in this
section as a non-grouping approach. In the experiment, we
measure the success rate of privacy preservation and search
performance. Grouping PPI’s are tested under different
group sizes. Given a network of fixed providers, we use
the group number to change average group size. We test
grouping PPI with the Chernoff bound-based and the
incremented expectation-based policy under the default
setting. The expected false positive rate is configured at
0.8, and the number of providers is 10, 000. We uniformly
sample 20 times and report the average results.
Results are illustrated in Figure 4. Non-grouping PPI
generally performs much better and is more stable than the
grouping approach in terms of success ratio. With proper
configuration (e.g. ∆ = 0.01 for incremental expectation-
based policy and γ = 0.9 for Chernoff policy), the non-
grouping ǫ-PPI always achieves near-1.0 success ratio.
By contrast, the grouping PPI’s display instability in their
success ratio. For example, as shown by the “Grouping
(#groups 2000)” series in Figure 4a, the success rate
fluctuates between 0.0 and 1.0, which renders it difficult to
provide a guarantee to the system and owners. The reason
is that with 2000 groups, sample space in each group is
too small (i.e., with 50 providers) to hold a stable result for
success ratio. When varying ǫ, similar behavior is shown
in Figure 4b; the success rate of grouping PPI’s quickly
degrades to 0, leading to unacceptable privacy quality. This
is due to the owner agnostic design in grouping PPI. This
set of experiments shows that the privacy degree of non-
grouping PPI’s can be effectively tuned in practice, imply-
ing the ease of configuration and more control exposed to
applications.



















(a) Varying identity frequency




















Fig. 4: Comparing non-grouping and grouping
B. Performance of Index Construction





















(a) Execution time with
single identity

















(b) Circuit size with single
identity


















(c) Scale up identity num-
ber
Fig. 5: Performance of index construction protocol
Experimental setup: We evaluate the performance
of our distributed ǫ-PPI construction protocol. Towards
that, we have implemented a functioning prototype. The
CountBelow is implemented by using an MPC software,
FairplayMP [13], which is based on Boolean circuits.
The implemented CountBelow protocol is written in
SFDL, a secure function definition language exposed by
FairplayMP, and is compiled by the FairplayMP runtime
to Java code, which embodies the generated circuit for
secure computation. We implement the SecSumShare
protocol in Java. In particular, we use a third-party li-
brary Netty [22] for network communication and Google’s
protocol buffer [23] for object serialization. We conduct
experiments on a number of machines in Emulab [24],
[25], each equipped with a 2.4 GHz 64-bit Quad Core
Xeon processor and 12 GB RAM. In the experiments,
the number of machines tested is varied from 3 to 9 (due
to limited resource at hand). For each experiment, the
protocol is compiled to and run on the same number of
parties. Each party is mapped to one dedicated physical
machine. The experiment uses a configuration of c = 3.
To justify the standpoint of our design that MPC is
expensive, we compare our reduced-MPC approach as
in the ǫ-PPI construction protocol against a pure MPC
approach. The pure MPC approach does not make use of
SecSumShare protocol to reduce the number of parties
involved in the generic MPC part and directly accepts
inputs from the m providers. The metric used in the
experiment is the start-to-end execution time, which is the
time duration from when the protocol starts to run to when
the last machine reports to finish. The result is shown as
in Figure 5a. It can be seen that the pure MPC approach
generally incurs longer execution time than our reduced-
MPC approach (used in ǫ-PPI construction): As the in-
formation network grows large, while the execution time
of pure MPC approach increases super-linearly, that of
reduced-MPC approach increases slowly. This difference is
due to the fact that the MPC computation in our reduced-
MPC approach is fixed to c parties and does not change
as the number of providers m grows. And the parallel
SecSumShare in reduced-MPC approach is scalable in
m as well, since each party runs in constant rounds, and
each round sends a constant number (at most c − 1) of
messages to its neighbors. For scaling with more parties,
we use the metric of circuit size, which is the size of
the compiled MPC program. As a valid metric, the circuit
size determines the execution time5 in real runs. By this
means, we can show the scalability result of up to 60
parties as in Figure 5b. Similar performance improvement
can be observed except that the circuit size grows linearly
with number of parties involved. Finally, we also study
the scalability from running the protocol with multiple
identities in a three-party network. The result in Figure 5c
shows that ǫ-PPI construction grows with the number of
identities at a much slower rate than that of the pure MPC
approach.
VI. Related Work
This section surveys related work on indexing support
on untrusted servers. We focus on information confiden-
tiality or privacy on secure index design, and do not survey
the issues of integrity and authenticity.
Non-encryption based privacy preserving index: PPI
is designed to index access controlled contents scattered
across multiple content providers. While being stored on
an untrusted server, PPI aims at preserving the content
privacy of all participant providers. Inspired by the privacy
definition of k-anonymity [26], existing PPI work [7],
[8], [9] follows the grouping-based approach; it organizes
providers into disjoint privacy groups, such that providers
from the same group are indistinguishable to the searchers.
To construct such indexes, many existing approaches [7],
[8], [27] assume providers are willing to disclose their
private local indexes, an unrealistic assumption when there
is a lack of mutual trust between providers. SS-PPI [9] is
proposed with resistance against colluding attacks. While
5Regarding the detailed definition of circuit size and the exact cor-
relation between circuit size and execution time, it can be found in
FairplayMP [13].
most existing grouping PPI’s utilize a randomized ap-
proach to form groups, its weakness is studied in SS-
PPI but without a viable solution. Though the group size
can be used to configure grouping-based PPI’s, it lacks
per-owner concerns and quantitative privacy guarantees.
Moreover, organizing providers in groups usually leads to
query broadcasting (e.g, with positive providers scattered
in all groups), rendering search performance inefficient.
By contrast, ǫ-PPI is a brand new PPI abstraction without
grouping (i.e. non-grouping PPI as mentioned before),
which provides quantitative privacy control on a per-owner
basis.
Secure index and search-able encryption: Building
searchable indexes over encrypted data has been widely
studied in the context of both symmetric key cryptogra-
phy [28] and public key cryptography [29], [30], [31]. In
this architecture, content providers build their local indices
and encrypt all the data and indices before submitting
them to the untrusted server. During query time, the
searcher first gets authenticated and authorized by the
corresponding content provider; the searcher then contacts
the untrusted server and searches against the encrypted
index. This system architecture makes the assumption that
a searcher already knows which provider possesses the data
of her interest, which is unrealistic in the PPI scenario.
Besides, unlike the encryption-based system, performance
is a motivating factor behind the design of our PPI, by
making no use of encryption during the query serving time.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose ǫ-PPI for quantitative privacy
control in information networks. The privacy of our ǫ-
PPI can be controlled by each individual in a quan-
titative fashion. We identify a vulnerability of generic
PPI on protecting common owner identities and address
this vulnerability in our ǫ-PPI design by proposing an
identity mixing technique. We have implemented the index
construction protocol without any trusted party and applied
a performance-optimization design that minimizes the
amount of secure computation. We have built a generic pri-
vacy threat model and performed security analysis which
shows the advantages of ǫ-PPI over other PPI system in
terms of privacy preservation quality.
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A. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof: We model the problem as Bernoulli trials and
prove the theorem by applying Chernoff bound. For a term
tj , the total number of false positive providers is modeled
as sum of T = m(1 − σj) Bernoulli trials, because there
are m(1 − σj) negative providers for term tj and each
negative provider independently and randomly publishes
its own bit, a process that can be modeled as a single
Bernoulli trials. In the trial, when the negative provider
becomes a false positive (i.e., 0 → 1) which occurs at
probability β(tj), the Bernoulli random variable, denoted
by X , takes on value 1. Otherwise, it takes the value 0.
Let E(X) be the expectation of variable X , which in our
case is,
E(X) = m(1− σj) · β(tj) (10)
We can apply the Chernoff bound for the sum of Bernoulli
trials, Pr(X ≤ (1− δ)E(X)) ≤ e−δ
2E(X)/2 [32], where
δ > 0 is any positive number. For term tj , the expected
success rate, denoted by pp(tj), is equal to the probability





pp(tj) = 1− Pr(fpj ≤ ǫj)


















that γ is the required minimal success rate. If we can have
1− e−δ
2
jm(1−σj)β(tj)/2 ≥ γ (12)
for all indexed terms, then ∀j, pp(tj) ≥ γ. This means
in the case of large number of terms, the percentage of
successfully published terms or pp is expected to be larger
than or equal to γ, i.e., pp ≥ γ, which is the proposition.














= Gj , and βc(tj) should be bigger than
βb(tj) since success ratio is larger than 50%. Solving
the inequality and taking only the solution that satisfies
βc(tj) > βb(tj), we have,
βc(tj) ≥ βb(tj) +Gj +
√
G2j + 2βb(tj)Gj
B. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof: Recoverability can be trivially proved based
on the fact that
∑
∀i∈[0,c−1] s(i, j) = vj .
To prove secrecy, we examine the process of gen-
erating super-shares s(i, j). It is easy to see that the
SecSumShare protocol uses a (c, c) secret sharing to
split each private input M(i, j). The generated c shares
for each input value are distributed to c different output
super-shares. For each private input M(i, j), an output
super share s(i, j) has included one and only one share
from it. Therefore, when an adversary knows at most
c − 1 outputs, at least one share of each private input is
still unknown to her. This leaves the value of any input
completely undetermined to this adversary, thus the secret
or the sum of input values completely undetermined.
Appendix B
Analysis of Conventional PPIs
We analyze the privacy of existing PPI work and
compare it with that of ǫ-PPI. Here, we consider the
primary attack and the common-term attack . Before that,
we briefly introduce the construction protocol of existing
PPI. To be consistent with terminology, we use term to
refer to owner’s identity in this section, for example, the
common-identity attack is referred to as the common-term
attack.
Grouping PPI: Inspired by k-anonymity [26], exist-
ing PPI work [7], [8], [9] constructs its index by using a
grouping approach. The idea is to assign the providers into
disjoint privacy groups, so that true positive providers are
mixed with the false positives in the same group and are
made indistinguishable. Then, a group reports binary value
1 on a term tj as long as there is at least one provider in
this group who possesses the term. For example, consider
terms are distributed in a raw matrix M as in Figure 2. If
providers p2 and p3 are assigned to the same group, say
g1, then in the published PPI group g1would report to have
term t0 and t2 but not t1, because both p2 and p3 do not
have term t1.
a) Privacy under primary attack: To form privacy
groups, existing PPIs randomly assign providers to groups.
By this means, the false positive rate resulted in the PPI
varies non-deterministically. Furthermore, grouping based
approach is fundamentally difficult to achieve per-term
privacy degree. Because different terms share the same
group assignment, even if one can tune grouping strategy
(instead of doing it randomly) to meet privacy requirement
for one or few terms, it would be extremely hard, if not
impossible, to meet the privacy requirement for thousands
of terms. For primary attack, the privacy leakage depends
on the false positive rate of row at term tj in PPI M
′.
This way, the grouping based PPI can at best provide a
privacy level at NOGUARANTEE for primary attacks. Our
experiments in Section V-A1 confirms our analysis as well.
b) Privacy under common-term attack: The group-
ing based PPI work may disclose the truthful term-to-
provider distribution and thus the identity of common
terms. We use a specific example to demonstrate this
vulnerability.
Example In an extreme scenario, one common term is
with 100% frequency and all other terms show up in only
one provider. For group assignment, as long as there are
more than two groups, the rare terms can only show up in
one group. In this case, the only common term in M ′ is
the true one in M , in spite of the grouping strategy. This
allows the attacker to be able to identify the true common
terms in M and mount an attack against it with 100%
confidence.
Given information of term distribution, one can fully
exploit the vulnerability to amount common-term attacks.
And the privacy degree depends on availability of term
distribution information. For certain existing PPI [9], it
directly leaks the sensitive common term’s frequency
σj to providers during index construction, leading to a
NOPROTECT privacy level. Other PPI work, which does
not leak exact term distribution information, still suffers




A. Effectiveness of different β-calculation
policies
We evaluate the effectiveness of three β-calculation
policies with ǫ-PPI, and the result shows the advantages
of Chernoff bound-based policy in meeting desired privacy
requirements. In the experiments, we have tested various
parameter settings. We show representative results with the
following values: ∆ = 0.02 in incremented expectation-
based policy and expected success rate γ = 0.9 in the
Chernoff bound based policy. The default false positive
rate is set at ǫ = 0.5. The experiment results are reported
in Figure 6; we consider success rate as the metric. In Fig-
ure 6a, we vary identity frequency from near 0 to about 500
providers with the number of providers fixed at 10, 000,
and in Figure 6b we vary the number of providers with the
identity frequency held constant at 0.1. It can be seen from
the results that while Chernoff bound-based policy (with
γ = 0.9) always achieves near-optimal success rate (i.e.,
close to 1.0), the other two policies fall short in certain
situations; the expectation-based policy is not configurable
and constantly has its success rate to be around 0.5. This is
expected because the expectation-based approach works on
an average sense. For the incremented expectation-based
policy, its success ratio, though approaching 1.0 in some
cases, is unsatisfactory for common identities with high
frequency (as in Figure 6a) and in the relatively small
network of few providers (as in Figure 6b). On the other
hand, the high-level privacy preservation of the Chernoff
bound policy comes with reasonable extra search overhead.
Due to space limit, this part of experiments can be found
in technical report [18].




























(a) Varying frequency under 10, 000
providers




























(b) Varying provider numbers under fre-
quency 0.1
Fig. 6: Quality of privacy preservation
